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11. INTRODUCTION
Overthepast two decades, subsidiesfor hiring unemployedworkers have
become an increasingly favored tool for dealing with unemployment. The
subsidies may be granted to employers or employees and they may be im-
plemented through a wide variety of policy instruments, such as tax breaks,
grants, and so on. Since these policies all have analogous effects on labor
market activities and government budgetary outlays, this paper groups them
together under the broad heading of “employment vouchers”.
Employment vouchers have some well-known advantages in compari-
son with other policy instruments to tackle high unemployment. First, the
vouchers are an appropriate way of dealing with a wide variety of market
failures that lead to excessivereal wages and thereby depress labor demand.
When the cost of labor is inefﬁciently high, employment vouchers are a
straightforward instrument to reduce labor costs, regardless of whether the
excessive costs are due to, say, efﬁciency wage, insider-outsider, or labor
union considerations. Second, employment vouchers operate as an auto-
matic stabilizer in the labor market, in contrast to discretionary subsidies to
groups of workers with particular characteristics. For example, if unskilled
service sector workers have the highest unemployment rate initially and
subsequently unemployment rises among semiskilled manufacturing labor,
then the targeting of the employment vouchers will automatically shift from
the ﬁrst group to the second.
This paper explores the optimal design of employment vouchers in the
context of a simple, empirically implementable, dynamic macroeconomic
model of the labor market. We aim to analyze the short- and long-term
effects of this policy on employment and unemployment, identify the major
channels whereby this policy works, examine the main obstacles inhibiting
the effectiveness of the policy, and investigate the role of the government
budget constraint on policy formation.
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Most theoretical and empirical studies about the effectiveness and de-
sirability of employment vouchers have been conducted in the context of
static analytical frameworks.
1 At best, work along these lines can isolate
only the short-run effects of the policy. As our analysis below shows, how-
ever, employment vouchers can be expected to have dynamic effects, and
these effects are likely to lead to outcomes that differ signiﬁcantly from
what may be expected to occur in the short run. The main reason is that
incumbent employees’ probabilities of being retained usually exceed the
unemployed workers’ probabilities of being hired. Consequently, provided
that employment vouchers stimulate hiring more than ﬁring, they improve
people’s longer-run job prospects and these long-term effects can dwarf the
short-term ones.
The existing macro literature on subsidizing employment has also tended
to ignore the full effects of these subsidies on the government’s budget. It
is standard to assume that the aggregate amount the government spends on
the subsidies must be equal to its aggregate tax receipts, e.g. receipts from
payroll taxes.
2 This approach is seriously incomplete, for a major cost of
unemployment to the government comes from unemployment beneﬁts and
other associated welfare state entitlements, and when the subsidies reduce
unemployment, the resulting reduction in the government’s unemployment
beneﬁt payments must be included in the government’sbudget constraint as
well.
Furthermore, theliteratureonempiricalevaluationsofemploymentvoucher
schemes tend to focus on just two factors limiting the effectiveness of this
policy: deadweight (vouchers given to people who would have found jobs
1See, for example, ((Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 1991), pp. 490-2) and (Snower
1994). It is also common for evaluations of this policy to be conducted within a static
framework of analysis (e.g. Institute for Employment Studies (1994), Hamblin Research
(1996),NERA (1995,1997),Woodburyand Spiegelman(1987)). Some dynamicanalyses
are quoted below, but they suffer from other deﬁciencies, to be covered presently.
2See, for example, (Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 1991), p. 490.THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMPLOYMENT VOUCHERS: A SIMPLE APPROACH 3
anyway) and displacement
3 (subsidized employees displacing current em-
ployees who are not subsidized). Our analysis shows, however, that al-
though these factors are important, they are far from constituting a compre-
hensive account of the main obstacles to this policy. Thus policy makers
who focus predominantly on them will gain a misleading picture of the
underlying problem and will be led inappropriate policy responses. Our
analysis permits a more balanced assessment of the channels whereby em-
ployment vouchers reduce unemployment.
Our analysis concentrates on six major determinants of optimal employ-
ment vouchers: (1) deadweight (represented by the hiring rate in the ab-
sence of vouchers), (2) hiring responsiveness (the effect of vouchers on the
hiring rate), (3) autonomous job loss (depicted by the ﬂow from employ-
ment into unemployment in the absence of the vouchers), (4) displacement
(represented by the effect of the vouchers on the ﬂow from employment to
unemployment), (5) unemployment beneﬁts, and (6) the budgetary alloca-
tion for the voucher policy (the government budget deﬁcit or surplus that
is to be generated through the policy). Surprisingly enough, the existing
theoretical literature on the macro-economic effects of subsidizing employ-
ment has paid scant attention to the inter-related roles of these factors in
employment policy formulation.
This paper covers these important neglected issues. Our aim is to con-
struct a model that is easy to use in the practical design of employment
voucher policy. In particular, our model is meant to provide a computa-
tional framework for evaluating the effectiveness of the policy, given only a
small number of empirically identiﬁable parameters. The existing dynamic
3We deﬁne displacement broadly to cover not only the replacement of incumbent em-
ployees by subsidized recruits within a particular ﬁrm,b u ta l s ointer-ﬁrm displacement
that arises when vouchers promote employment at labor-intensive ﬁrms at the expense of
dismissals in capital-intensive ﬁrms.4 J. MICHAEL ORSZAG AND DENNIS J. SNOWER
models
4 for employment policy evaluation tend to be black boxes, whose
predictions depend on a larger number of microeconomic parameters that
are difﬁcult to assess. The underlying problem is that general equilibrium
models derived from microeconomic foundations are generally difﬁcult to
parameterize reliably for policy prediction purposes. In this paper we avoid
this difﬁculty by adopting a simple, empirically tractable methodology. The
dynamic effects arising from the difference between retention and hiring
probabilitiescan be captured straightforwardly through a model of the labor
market in which workers’ transitions between employment and unemploy-
ment are governedby a Markov process. We specify thetransitionprobabil-
ities as simple, identiﬁable functions of the employment vouchers, without
specifying an underlying, full-blown choice theoretic foundations. (We do,
however, provide an illustrative microfoundations model in Appendix E.)
Although this methodology imposes some limits on the applicability of our
results (to be discussed below), it does have the advantage of simplicity and
empirical tractability.
In this context, the paper focuses on a simple, useful policy problem,
namely, to ﬁnd the magnitude of employment vouchers that minimize the
level of unemployment, subject to a government budget constraint. It is with
reference to this policy objective that we explore the properties of the “op-
timal” employment voucher. We begin by concentrating on self-ﬁnancing
employment vouchers, i.e. ones whose cost to the government does not ex-
ceed the corresponding amount saved on unemployment beneﬁts. We then
examine how the optimal policy is affected by a change in the government
budget constraint, viz, a switch from a self-ﬁnancing policy to vouchers
on which the government does not spend more than a ﬁxed amount, which
could be positive (implying budget deﬁcit from the voucher policy) or neg-
ative (implying a surplus).
4See, for instance, Hoon and Phelps (1996), Millard and Mortensen (1997), Mortensen
and Phelps (1994), Phelps and Hoon (1992), and Pissarides (1994).THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMPLOYMENT VOUCHERS: A SIMPLE APPROACH 5
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our Markov model
of the labor market and describes the government’s budget constraint. Sec-
tion 3 focuses attention on some particularly important dynamic implica-
tions of employment vouchers by considering the simple case in which the
hiring probability depends linearly on the voucher and the ﬁring probability
is constant, so that there is no displacement. In this context, we derive the
optimal long-run, self-ﬁnancing vouchers. This analysis highlights the role
of deadweight in the design of employment vouchers. Section 4 solves the
policyproblem when both thehiring and ﬁring probabilitiesdepend linearly
on the voucher. This model sheds light on the joint role of displacement and
deadweightcostsinsubsidydesign. Section 5calibratesthemodeland eval-
uates the effectiveness of the policy for a wide range of feasible parameters.
Then Section 6 derives bounds for the vouchers when the hiring and ﬁring
probabilities have more general functional forms. Section 7 moves beyond
self-ﬁnancing employment vouchers by deriving the optimal policy when
the government runs a speciﬁed policy-induced deﬁcit or surplus. Finally,
Section 8 concludes.
2. THE UNDERLYING MODEL
Time is discrete and workers can be in one of two states, employment or
unemployment. Let
h be the probability that an unemployed worker will be
hired, and
f be the probability that an employed worker will become un-
employed (e.g., be “fired”). The labor force




t be employment rate in period
t (the level of employment as
a fraction of the labor force) and
u
t be the unemployment rate (the level of
5This simplifying assumption is one of substance. If the employment vouchers, in rais-
ing employment, also raise the labour supply (by reducing the discouraged worker effect),
then the vouchers will have a smaller effect on unemployment than they would in the ab-
sence of a labour supply response.6 J. MICHAEL ORSZAG AND DENNIS J. SNOWER





















1) is the difference between the number of people hired



















































































(Illustrative microfoundations for the hiring and ﬁring rates are given in
Appendix E.)
Wenow turn to the effect of employmentvouchers on this system. We as-
sumethat each unemployed worker receives the same employmentvoucher,
granted for one period. Let
v be the “voucher ratio,” i.e., the ratio of the em-
ployment voucher to the wage.
6 An increase in the voucher ratio stimulates



























6In what follows, all incentives to hire and ﬁre will be speciﬁed relative to the wage.THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMPLOYMENT VOUCHERS: A SIMPLE APPROACH 7
(Firing is encouraged through the displacement of incumbent employees by
subsidized new entrants.
7) These hiring and ﬁring functions are reduced
forms; they represent the degree to which the employment voucher affects
the employees’ incentives to work and the ﬁrms’ incentives to employ, tak-
ing into account heterogeneity of jobs and workers, self-selection bias, and
so on.
8
By Eqs. (1), (2), (3) and (4) above, we obtain the following employment
equation, showing how the government can affect the long-run unemploy-
ment rate









































The voucher stimulates steady-state (long-run) employment so long as it
raises the hiring rate by proportionately more than it raises the ﬁring rate.
1
0
7In practice, displacement is to some degree matter of policy choice since the policy
maker can reduce displacement, say, by ﬁning employers who can be shown to have
replaced incumbent employees by new recruits. The greater the degree to which anti-
displacement provisionsare monitored and enforced,the less the ﬁring rate will depend on
the vouchers and, since these provisions generally raise the cost of recruitment, they also
reduce the responsiveness of the hiring rate to the vouchers.
8For this reason it is unnecessary for us to specify how the hiring rates and the ﬁring
rates differ across groups of workers, e.g., incumbents versus subsidized workers.
9For practical policy purposes, focusing on the long-run steady state is not as serious a
limitation as it may appear at ﬁrst sight, since in general it is politically and institutionally
infeasible to devise detailed rules whereby employment vouchers vary through time in
response to changing labor market conditions.
1
















































































In what follows, we plausibly take this to be the case.
Some have argued that in the long-run that any wage subsidy leads to an
equal increase in the wage that employees receive, and consequently wage
subsidies have no effect on long-run labor costs or long-run employment.
(For example (Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 1991) (p. 108) uses a version
ofthisargument, applied to taxeson labor.) Theargument is thatifthewage
is the outcome of a Nash bargain and if the subsidy falls in equal propor-
tions on the employees’ take-home pay and on their fall-back position, then
the subsidy can be factored out of the Nash maximand, leaving the wage
paid by the ﬁrm unchanged. This argument, however, is unlikely to hold
in practice, particularly for vouchers to previously unemployed workers.
First, these vouchers may be expected to induce people to move from inac-
tivity to active job search, thus raising the supply of labor, reducing wages,
and raising employment. Second, the fall-back position of previously un-
employed people depends on unemployment beneﬁts, minimum wages and
welfare state entitlements, and the latter need not necessarily rise in propor-
tion to the vouchers. Third, in the transition to the long run, the vouchers
may be expected to raise the number of employees relative to the number
of unemployed people, and if (as is generally the case) the retention rate of
employees tends to exceed the hiring rate for the unemployed (at any given
real wage) the vouchers will then raise the long-run employment rate. Fi-
nally, the vouchers will generally raise the recruits’ take-home pay relative
to their non-wage income and thereby induce them to work harder, shirk
less, and be less motivated to quit, thereby reducing the proﬁt-maximizing
efﬁciency wage. For these various reasons, we will assume here that there
is a positive long-run equilibrium relation between the hiring rate and the
magnitude of the employment voucher.THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMPLOYMENT VOUCHERS: A SIMPLE APPROACH 9
2.2. The Government Budget Constraint. As noted, the government’s
policy problem is to ﬁnd the magnitude of the voucher that minimizes the
unemployment rate, subject to the government budget constraint. We spec-




) be the long-run un-
employment rate as a function of the voucher ratio
v. Then, since the num-



















This cost must be set against the “voucher revenue”, which is the to-










run unemploymentrates in the presence and absence of thevoucher, respec-
tively. Let the replacement ratio (the ratio of the unemployment beneﬁt to
the wage)
b be a positive constant. Then the amount that the employment















G be the maximum lump-sum cost per capita of the employ-
ment policy to the government, per capita, relative to the wage
w.(
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) from reduced unemployment.
















), need not be not monotonic in




voucher may actually reduce government spending on the vouchers, since

















vided that voucher cost rises faster with the level of the voucher than does10 J. MICHAEL ORSZAG AND DENNIS J. SNOWER
voucher revenue, then at higher levels of the voucher ratio (and lower levels
of the replacement ratio) an increase in the voucher ratio will of course raise
government spending, and at the policy optimum — when unemployment




￿ is such that






























Observe that the greater is net government spending
G, the greater is the
maximumvoucher ratio that satisﬁes the governmentbudget constraint, and
consequently the greater is the employment rate generated by the policy.
In what follows, we will assume that





that there exists a voucher ratio
v
>




Then, by the employment equation Eq. (11.A) and the government bud-
get constraint Eq. (7’), the optimal voucher ratio (
v













































Eq. (8) deﬁnes optimal voucher policy implicitly. In the next two sections,










3. OPTIMAL EMPLOYMENT VOUCHERS IN THE ABSENCE
OF DISPLACEMENT



































0 involves more algebra which can obscure some of the economic
insights; thus, we will deal with it separately in Section 7.THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMPLOYMENT VOUCHERS: A SIMPLE APPROACH 11















￿” stands for “employment” and “
￿” stands for “job loss”. The
coefﬁcient
￿
0 stands for deadweight (the hiring rate in the absence of the
voucher),
￿
1 is hiringresponsiveness (the effect of the voucher on the hiring
rate); and
￿
0 is autonomous job loss (the rate at which employees become
unemployed).
3.1. The Optimal Voucher. Substituting the hiring function Eq. (15.A)





























































































For a balanced budget policy (
G
=
0), the government budget constraint
















































: (13)12 J. MICHAEL ORSZAG AND DENNIS J. SNOWER
Sincethevoucherstimulatesemployment,
1
3 theoptimalvoucher(at an inte-
rior optimum
1
4) satisﬁes this constraint with an equality. Expressing these
terms as magnitudes in units of the voucher ratio per person unemployed

































i.e., the voucher cost (per unemployed person, in voucher units) is not
greater than the voucher revenue (measured in the same terms).
The voucher cost may be divided into two components: (i) deadweight,
￿
0 (the cost of providing vouchers for people who would have become em-
ployed anyway) and (ii) the voucher cost of induced hiring
￿
1
v.B y E q .
(14), this means that the voucher cost of induced hiring must not exceed










































































































5(Orszag and Snower 1997) achieve the same result for a much more complex model
involving an inﬁnite number of states but constant transition rates.THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMPLOYMENT VOUCHERS: A SIMPLE APPROACH 13
Thus, for the linear hiring function (15.A) and the constant ﬁring rate
(15.B), the optimal voucher ratio
1
6
￿ rises at an increasing rate with hiring responsiveness
￿
1 and
￿ falls at an increasing rate with deadweight
￿
0 and autonomous job loss
￿
0.
The intuition underlying these results is clariﬁed in Figs.(1). Here the
C curve represents voucher cost (Eq. (11)) and the
R curve stands for
voucher revenue (Eq. (12)), both as a function of the voucher ratio. The
voucher ratio that minimizes unemployment is the maximal voucher for
which voucher revenue does not fall short of voucher cost. Thus the opti-
mal voucher lies at the intersection of the
C and
R curves.
An increase in deadweight shifts the voucher cost curve upwards, since
this causes more people to qualify for the voucher. It also shifts the voucher
revenue curve downwards, since it reduces the difference between unem-
ployment in the absence and presence of the voucher. Consequently, as
shown in Fig. (1a) the optimal voucher ratio falls.
An increase in hiring responsiveness raises voucher revenue (since un-
employment in the presence of the voucher rises relative to unemployment
in its absence) and raises the voucher cost curve (since more people get the
voucher); however, the former effect dominates (see Appendix A for the
details) so that the optimal voucher ratio increases as shown in Fig. (1b).
Along the same lines, an increase in autonomous job loss raises the
voucher cost curve (since some of the extra people who lose their jobs get
the voucher) and also raises the voucher revenue curve (since it increases
the difference between unemployment in the absence and presence of the
voucher). As shown in Appendix A, the former effect dominates so that the
optimal voucher ratio decreases as illustrated in Fig. (1c).
1
6In the context of our analysis, it is not possible to assess the inﬂuence of the replace-
mentratio
bonthe optimalvoucher,since sincewe havenotspeciﬁedhowthisreplacement
ratio affect the hiring and ﬁring functions.14 J. MICHAEL ORSZAG AND DENNIS J. SNOWER
3.2. The Short-run versus Long-run Effectiveness of the Policy. It is
worth noting that our analysis of voucher effectiveness is starkly at odds
with a large body of empirical evaluations undertaken in various OECD
countries(((NERA)1997),((NERA)1995),(MartinHanblinResearch 1996),
(Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987) and (Institute for Employment Studies
1994)). The standard practice in these evaluations is to measure the effec-
tiveness of employment subsidies by seeking the following statistics: how
many people in the targeted group got jobs within a limited period of time
(typically a quarter or a year), how many of these people would have gained
employment without the subsidy within that period, how many incumbent
employees (outside the target group) were displaced by subsidized workers
within that period, and how many non-employed people outside the tar-
get group were left jobless within that period even though they would have
found jobs in the absence of the subsidy. This approach focuses on the
short-run effects of the policy, largely ignoring the dynamic repercussions
in the longer run. Although the empirical evaluations do occasionally dis-
tinguish between short-run and long-run elasticities of labor demand, they
generally do not examine - as our analysis here has done - the effects of the
policy on the transition rates between employment and unemployment, and
thus they are unable to evaluate the effects of the policy once the associated
lagged adjustment processes have worked themselves out.
It is interesting to examine the nature of this bias. Do the empirical eval-
uations tend to over-estimate or under-estimate the long-run effects of the
policy? To shed lighton thisissue, wewill examinetwo features: (i) thedif-
ference between the short-run and long-run employment effects of a given
voucherratio and(ii)thedifferencebetweentheshort-runand long-runself-
ﬁnancing, unemployment-minimizing voucher ratio. We will show how
deadweight (
￿
0), autonomous job loss (
￿
0), and hiring responsiveness (
￿
1)
inﬂuence these features.THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMPLOYMENT VOUCHERS: A SIMPLE APPROACH 15
The difference between the short-run and long-run employment effects
of a given voucher may be derived straightforwardly as follows. By Eqs.



























































1. To make this effect comparable with its long-run
counterpart, we evaluate both at the long-run unemployment rate. Thus






















































By Eq. (18) and Eq. (17), the difference between the long- and short-run







































































8 In other words, the empirical
evaluations above must under-estimate the employment effect of the policy.
1




















8This result does not depend on the assumption that the hiring rate is linear and that





















































(by Eqs. 2) , so that short-run effect of the voucher (starting from a steady state, using Eq.16 J. MICHAEL ORSZAG AND DENNIS J. SNOWER
The previous equation indicates that the difference between the long-run
and short-run employment effects will be greater
￿ the greater is the deadweight
￿
0.
￿ the greater is the autonomous job loss (
￿
0), and
￿ the greater is the hiring responsiveness (
￿
1).




























1 into the government budget constraint Eq. (7), setting
G
=











































Furthermore, substitutingthehiring function Eq. (15.A) and the ﬁring func-













The optimal short-run voucher is:
1
9



















































































If condition (6 ) holds (so that the proportional increase in hiring exceeds the propor-
tional increase in ﬁring in response to the voucher), then the long-run and short-run em-













) — which holds whenever current employees have some degree of job
security which currently unemployed people do not share — the long-run employment
effect of the voucher will exceed the short-run effect.
1




the upper bound on the hiring rate (
h
￿



















Assuming that the retention rate exceeds the hiring rate, observe that the
short- and long-run vouchers have the same voucher cost but the long-run
voucher yields greater voucher revenue than the short-run voucher. Thus,




































￿ the smaller is the deadweight
￿
0 and
￿ the smaller is the ﬁring rate in the absence of the voucher (
￿
0).
4. THE OPTIMAL VOUCHER IN THE PRESENCE OF
DISPLACEMENT
We now consider the inﬂuence of displacement on the optimal employ-
ment voucher policy. For this purpose, we amend the ﬁring function to
make the ﬁring rate (like the hiring rate equation 15.A) depend positively




















1 are positive constants.
Theusualdeﬁnitionofpolicy-induceddisplacementissimplythenumber
ofpeoplewholosetheirjobsonaccountofthepolicy. Ourdynamicanalysis
offers a richer account of displacement than is possible within the standard
staticframework, since it draws attention to the importantfact that when the
hiring rate (






employed, displacement in the short run will be greater than displacement
in the long run.18 J. MICHAEL ORSZAG AND DENNIS J. SNOWER
In the short run, displacement may be measured by the policy-induced














The corresponding measure is the policy-induced change in the probability
























Under our assumption that the voucher has greater proportional effect on
hiring than on ﬁring (condition (6)), this magnitude is negative. In the anal-
ysis that follows, however, we will stick to the short-run deﬁnition of dis-
placement, measuring it by the parameter
￿
1.

















































































































Thus, expressing both voucher revenue and voucher cost as magnitudes in















0When the transitions between labor market states are described by a Markov process,
a person’s long-run probability of being unemployed does not depend on initial employ-
ment status.
2








1 . However, we have










0. If the initial hire rate is greater than the initial ﬁre rate (as in
every major industrialized country), this condition implies that the hire rate restriction is






































by Eqs. (25) and (7’).




























































i.e., if the ratio of hiring responsiveness to deadweight exceeds the ratio of
displacement to autonomous job loss. This relation is equivalent to (12).








































































As shown in Appendix B and Section 5, the optimal voucher ratio
￿ rises at a decreasing rate (rather than increasing) rate with hiring re-
sponsiveness
￿
1 (for the central estimates of the other parameters),
￿ falls at a decreasing (rather than increasing) rate with deadweight
￿
0
and autonomous job loss
￿
0 (for the central estimates of the other pa-
rameters), and





















which is equivalent to Eq. (29).20 J. MICHAEL ORSZAG AND DENNIS J. SNOWER
4.2. The Short-Run versus Long-Run Effectiveness of the Policy. It can
be shown that in the presence of displacement (as in its absence), the long-
run employment effects of balanced budget vouchers are typically larger
than short-run effects. In fact, as we will see below, for a wide range of fea-
sible parameter values, the optimal, self-ﬁnancing voucher ratios are zero
in the short run, but signiﬁcantly positive in the long run.
It is straightforward to show that the unemployment effect of a given
voucher ratio is greater in the long run than in the short run. By Eqs. (2),





































































1 and evaluating this expression at the long-run unemploy-







































































Thus, we ﬁnd (once again) that the long-run effect exceeds the short-run ef-
fect if the denominator is less than one (which occurs under our assumption
that the retention rate exceeds the hire rate).
Next, it can be shown that the optimal voucher ratio is greater in the long
run than in the short run. In the short-run, applying the government budget

































































































Sincedisplacementacts primarilyto reduce therevenuefrom thereplace-
mentratio
b, theshort-runvoucher(34)issmallerthantheshort-runvoucher












Appendix C sheds some light on the properties of optimal employment
vouchers in more general contexts where the hire and ﬁre rates are nonlin-
ear functions of the voucher. Appendix D extends the analysis above by
considering voucher policies that generate a speciﬁed net deﬁcit or surplus
to the government (rather than being self-ﬁnancing).
5. EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE POLICY
We now evaluate the effectiveness of the policy by calibrating our model
and deriving the inﬂuence of the optimal voucher on unemployment for a
wide range of feasible parameters. Our analysis shows that, for parameter
ranges centered on valuesthat appear reasonablefor EU countries, thelong-
run unemployment effects of the policy are substantial and these effects
signiﬁcantly exceed the corresponding short-run effects.
Let the period of analysis be one quarter. A reasonable estimate for av-
erage job tenure in the EU is about 10 years (40 quarters) (c.f., (Burgess
and Rees December 1994), (Simon Burgess and Rees October 1997)). With
constant separation rates, a job duration estimate of 60 quarters translates22 J. MICHAEL ORSZAG AND DENNIS J. SNOWER
into an autonomous job loss (
￿
0
;the separation rate in the absence of vouch-






For unemployment, the OECD reports fractions of workers who have
been unemployed for over a year (4 quarters). As shown in Appendix G, if
thetransitionrateoutofunemploymentis
h, then thesteadystateproportion






































5 which is broadly representative of the EU. However, since the
optimal voucher and the corresponding effect on unemployment rises with
the replacement ratio, we use this value to derive conservative estimates of
the policy’s effectiveness.
We calibrate the hiring responsiveness parameter
￿
1 conservatively, set-
ting this parameter to obtain a relatively low estimate of the effects of
vouchers on unemployment. Estimates of hiring elasticities in the litera-
ture (e.g. (Holzer, Katz, and Krueger 1991) and (Krueger 1988)) led Card
and Krueger ((Card and Krueger 1995)) to conclude the elasticity of hiring







The above estimates of the hiring elasticity are relevant, but not imme-
diately applicable, to our model, since the elasticity above is deﬁned with
respect to permanent wage changes whereas the employment vouchers are
short-lived. Thus the elasticity with respect to vouchers may be expected
to be substantially than that with respect to wages. (Snower 1996) provides
arguments that the voucher elasticity of employment is about one third of
the corresponding wage elasticity of employment. The ratio of these two
elasticities will typically be smaller than the ratio of the voucher elasticity
2
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of hiring relativeto thewage elasticity of hiring, sinceemploymentdepends
on both hiring and separations, and a wage increase will generally reduce
the separation rate while a voucher increase will increase it (on account of




5 for the elasticity of hiring with respect to vouchers.
(Our analysis of policy effectiveness will however be conducted for a wide
range of elasticities around this estimate).
Furthermore, in our baseline calibrations we set the elasticity of separa-
tions with respect to the voucher of
0
:
1 and then examine voucher effective-
ness for a wide range of elasticities around this value. In practice, as noted,
the elasticity depends on the existence of anti-displacement provisions. Di-





h) and the elasticity of separations with respect to vouchers (
￿
s)a n d
given our estimates of deadweight (
￿
0) and autonomous job loss (
￿
0), we































and the voucher is set at its optimal level.
Our baseline calibration parameters are summarized in Table 1. We fo-
cus on balanced budget policies:
G
=
0. In this baseline case, the optimal





9 and, as a result, the steady state unem-








%. However, the short-run voucher is





0 Separation Rate 0.025
￿
1 Voucher Effectiveness 0.32332
￿
1 Displacement 0.0037097
b Replacement Ratio 0.50
TABLE 1. Calibrated model parameters
In ﬁgures (2)-(6), we present the optimal voucher in the short run and
long run and the associated unemployment rate, for a wide range of feasible
parameter values.
2
4 The results indicate that for realistic elasticity values, a




Figs. (2) shows how optimal vouchers and unemployment vary with the
deadweight in the short and long run. As the ﬁgures show, the policy is un-
able to have any effect on unemployment in the short run. In the long-run,






















Figs. (3) show how theunemploymentfalls and the optimalvoucher rises
with a rise in the effectiveness of employment vouchers. Once again, the
policyisineffectivein theshort run, but in thelong-runthevoucher-induced











4Observe that the baseline unemployment rate (Eq. (11.B) with
v
=







5We invite the reader to experiment with parameter values either using the formu-
lae in the paper or our on-line voucher calculator. We have a Java applet available at
http://www.econ.bbk.ac.uk/vouchers/Vouchers.html to compute opti-
mal vouchers using the formulae in this paper.THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMPLOYMENT VOUCHERS: A SIMPLE APPROACH 25

















Figs. (4) show how the optimal voucher and the corresponding unem-
ployment rate rise with the autonomous job loss parameter in the presence
and absence of the employment vouchers. While the policy is not self-
ﬁnancing in the short run, it once again appears to be effective in the long
























Along the same lines, Figures (5) and (6) show how the optimal voucher
and corresponding unemployment rate vary with the replacement ratio and
the displacement parameters. In both cases the policy has a powerful effect
on the long-run unemployment rate over the entire range of parameter val-
ues. Also observe that, given the central estimates of the other parameters,
the policy is not self-ﬁnancing in the short-run.
6. CONCLUSION
Unemploymentbeneﬁtsystemshavebecomeacostlyobligationformany
governments. Since these systems can provide a substantial safety net with-
out substantial government expenditures only when the unemployment rate
is low, it is not surprising that these systems have come under attack in the
two decades of high unemployment experienced in many European coun-
tries and elsewhere. What has made unemployment beneﬁt systems par-
ticularly difﬁcult to defend when unemployment is high is that they dis-
courage job search and thereby augment the problem they are meant to ad-
dress. The analysis of this paper has suggested an alternative approach to
these systems: instead of seeing unemployment beneﬁt payments merely
as support given to people on the condition that they remain jobless, they
can be used as a source of funding for employment-creating policies. We26 J. MICHAEL ORSZAG AND DENNIS J. SNOWER
have explored how employment vouchers, in reducing unemployment, cre-
ate “voucher revenue” for the government (saving in terms of unemploy-
ment beneﬁts) and how this revenue can be used to ﬁnance the vouchers
themselves (wholly or partially). Thereby unemployment beneﬁts become
less of a drag on government ﬁnances and on labor market performance,
and turn into a useful resource instead.
In recent years, policy makers have come increasingly to recognize the
potential importance of subsidizing the jobs of currently unemployed peo-
ple. But despite the growing interest in the design of such policies, there
has been little dynamic analysis of the optimal policies and their short-
and long-term employment effects. This paper provides a simple analyti-
cal framework for doing so.
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APPENDIX A: COMPARATIVE STATICS IN THE ABSENCE OF
DISPLACEMENT
This appendix reviews some comparative statics results for the basic
model without displacement which are shown graphically in Figs. (1)-(4).
Deadweight



































































































































































































The effect on revenues (using Eq. (12) is somewhat complex. The reason
for thisis that a change in autonomousﬁring effects both theunemployment2 J. MICHAEL ORSZAG AND DENNIS J. SNOWER
rate with and without vouchers. The revenue expression can be rewritten in



















































































































































We expect the opposite to occur and therefore the second term in brackets
will be smaller and the voucher revenue curve will shift up.



















APPENDIX B: COMPARATIVE STATICS IN THE PRESENCE OF
DISPLACEMENT

























































Since both terms in brackets in Eq. (B.1) are positive, the optimal voucher






























































0.4 J. MICHAEL ORSZAG AND DENNIS J. SNOWER
APPENDIX C: NONPARAMETRIC BOUNDS
To shed some light on the properties of optimal employment vouchers in
more general contextswhere the hire and ﬁre rates are nonlinear functionals
of the voucher, this section derives non-parametric bounds for the voucher,
applicable for broad classes of the hiring and ﬁring functions.
6.1. An Upper Bound When the Maximum Hiring Rate is Known. We




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































For cases in which voucher effectiveness is known, a better bound is
provided below. We proceed to extend the bounds for cases in which ﬁre
rates depend on vouchers.
































































































































0. This reproduces our result in Section 4 that optimal
vouchers grow at most with the square root of the replacement ratio.




































) so that ﬁre rates are constant and do not















































































































which is the result obtained in Section 3 where
~




7. APPENDIX D: POLICIES THAT GENERATE A DEFICIT OR SURPLUS












































This implies that the optimal voucher




















































































0 (E.1.B)THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMPLOYMENT VOUCHERS: A SIMPLE APPROACH 7

























which agrees with the formula in Eq. (16) when
G
=
0 . Since the expected
time workers spend employed after receiving a voucher is
1
￿
0, the third term
on the right hand side of Eq. (E.2) may be interpreted as a government
spending multiplier.8 J. MICHAEL ORSZAG AND DENNIS J. SNOWER
8. APPENDIX E: ILLUSTRATIVE MICROFOUNDATIONS FOR THE
HIRING AND FIRING RATES
The probabilities of hiring (
h)a n dﬁ r i n g(
f) have been derived from var-
ious microeconomic foundations in the literature.
2
6 Since our analysis is
concerned with these probabilities only through their response to employ-
ment vouchers, we willconsideronly a very rudimentary derivationof these
probabilities.
Suppose that the productivity
a of a recently hired worker is a random














0)a n di s
independently distributed across the newly hired workers. The productivity




￿.W el e t
w be the
real wage,
v be the “voucher ratio” (the ratio of the voucher to the wage for




















0 (i.e., theentrant generates positiveproﬁt).







































































i.e., ﬁring occurs when (i) the proﬁt generated by the incumbent is less than






which case the incumbent is replaced by an entrant)
2
8 or (ii) the loss gener-
ated by the incumbent is less than the ﬁring cost (in which case the incum-



























the incumbent is replaced. Thus, the ﬁring probability (i.e., the probability
2
6For example, (Phelps 1994).
2
7For simplicity, we assume that the ﬁrm has a one-period time horizon.
2
8We assume that the incumbent is ﬁred even though he may generate positive proﬁt,











































Assume that wages are set before the employment decisions are made.
The wages are the outcome of a Nash bargain between each ﬁrm and its
























). Assuming for simplicity that





























￿ (a constant) is the bargaining powerof the employeerelativeto that














































































9For simplicity, we assume that, under disagreement, the worker produces no output,
is paid no wage and engages in industrial action whose cost to the ﬁrm is high enough
to make the ﬁrm indifferent between retaining and ﬁring the worker, as in (Lindbeck and
Snower 1990), for example.
3
0This assumption is made only for the sake of algebraic simplicity; it is not necessary
for the derivation of the hiring and ﬁring functions (44) and (45). If the wage were set






w and the Nash
maximand would be a third-order polynomial in
w.10 J. MICHAEL ORSZAG AND DENNIS J. SNOWER
We note from Eq. (42) and (43) that the voucher ratio
v stimulates hiring
and ﬁring. (Firing is encouraged through the displacement of incumbent
employees by subsidized new entrants.
3






























Eqs. (44) and (45) could be derived for a wide variety of existing labor
market models, and Eq. (38) and Eq.(39) are simply illustrative.
3
1In practice, displacement is to some degree matter of policy choice since the pol-
icy maker can reduce displacement, say, by ﬁning employers who can be shown to have
replaced incumbent employees by new recruits. The greater the degree to which anti-
displacement provisionsare monitored and enforced,the less the ﬁring rate will depend on
the vouchers and, since these provisions generally raise the cost of recruitment, they also
reduce the responsiveness of the hiring rate to the vouchers.
3
2In practice, the functional form will depend, in addition to the factors enumerated
above, on the degree of heterogeneity in the productivities of workers and jobs.THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMPLOYMENT VOUCHERS: A SIMPLE APPROACH 1
APPENDIX G: THE FRACTION OF LONG TERM UNEMPLOYED
This appendix derives the fraction of long term unemployed used in the














































the number of entrants to unemployment





























0 is the number of entrants to unemployment (and the superscript
s
denotes the steady state).








































































y. This calculation assumes

















FIGURE 1. Comparative statics. Fig. (1a) (upper left):
the effect of an increase in deadweight loss. Fig (1b) (up-
per right): the the effect of an increase in hiring responsive-
ness. Fig. (1c) (lower left): the effect of an increase in au-
tonomous job loss.THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMPLOYMENT VOUCHERS: A SIMPLE APPROACH 3





































Unemployment in the long−run
Unemployment in the short−run
FIGURE 2. The Effects of Deadweight4 J. MICHAEL ORSZAG AND DENNIS J. SNOWER



































Unemployment in the long−run
Unemployment in the short−run
FIGURE 3. The Effects of Hiring ResponsivenessTHE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMPLOYMENT VOUCHERS: A SIMPLE APPROACH 5
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Unemployment in the long−run
Unemployment in the short−run
FIGURE 4. The Effects of Autonomous Job Loss6 J. MICHAEL ORSZAG AND DENNIS J. SNOWER


































Unemployment in the long−run
Unemployment in the short−run
FIGURE 5. The Effects of the Replacement Ratio.THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMPLOYMENT VOUCHERS: A SIMPLE APPROACH 7








































Unemployment in the long−run
Unemployment in the short−run
FIGURE 6. The Effects of Displacement.